We investigate the entry, exit and growth of commercial banks in the United States (US) during the period 1984-2012. Hazard function estimations for the probability of exit via acquisition and failure, and crosssectional growth regressions examine the impact of exit through merger and acquisition (M&A) or failure, and internally-generated growth. The hazard of disappearance via acquisition is inversely to asset size and quality, profitability, managerial efficiency and capitalization, and positively related to liquidity. Small banks with a higher proportion of their assets in lending, and small banks with high credit risk, are more likely to fail. We report evidence of an inverse relationship between bank size and growth, and some evidence of persistence in growth performance from one year to the next among smaller banks. We investigate the entry, exit and growth of commercial banks in the United States (US) during the period 1984-2012. Hazard function estimations for the probability of exit via acquisition and failure, and cross-sectional growth regressions examine the impact of exit through merger and acquisition (M&A) or failure, and internally-generated growth. The hazard of disappearance via acquisition is inversely to asset size and quality, profitability, managerial efficiency and capitalization, and positively related to liquidity. Small banks with a higher proportion of their assets in lending, and small banks with high credit risk, are more likely to fail. We report evidence of an inverse relationship between bank size and growth, and some evidence of persistence in growth performance from one year to the next among smaller banks.
Introduction
Deregulation and technological and financial innovation have transformed the banking industry. In the US, the geographic and product market regulations that constrained the scale and scope of commercial banks have been removed and barriers to entry in many markets have been reduced or eliminated. Opportunities for growth have been created for new entrants and established banks, which many have realized via organic diversification or acquisition. Banks that have grown quickly have become less like traditional community banks (which rely on soft information), and use a high output, low cost business models that relies on scale economies, and automated production and distribution processes to deliver standardized products and services (DeYoung, 2014) .
1 These changes have impacted profoundly upon the structure of the US banking industry. There has been large scale consolidation through merger and acquisition, and through bank failure. A significant number of new banks have entered the industry, but not on a scale sufficient to offset the decline in bank numbers through consolidation.
An understanding of the underlying mechanisms that determine the structure of the banking industry is relevant for small firm financing and investment, anti-trust policy, financial regulation and supervision, and financial stability (Cettorelli and Gambera, 2001; Gilbert and Zaretsky, 2003; Avery and Samolyk, 2004; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2006) . This paper presents an empirical analysis of the evolution of industry structure for commercial banks in the United States (US) during the period . The investigation follows similar procedures to a study of the corporate demography of the US credit union industry reported by Goddard, McKillop and Wilson (2014) . The investigation is focused 1 Berger, Kashyap and Scalise (1995) , Jones and Critchfield (2005), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2012) and DeYoung (2014) describe various aspects of the evolution of the US banking industry.
particularly on the impact of merger and acquisition (M&A), failure, entry, and internally generated growth on industry structure. Specific research questions include the following:
What is the relationship between bank size and the propensity of banks to fail, or to be acquired? What is the relationship between bank size and growth? Do small and large banks grow differently?
The data used in the present study are of exceptionally high quality, providing virtually 100% coverage of the US commercial banking industry, over a 29-year period. We are able to track attrition in the population to a very high level of accuracy. The econometric analysis includes an estimation of hazard functions for the determinants of exit through acquisition or failure; and a series of cross-sectional estimations of the relationship between bank size and internally generated growth, which control for survivorship effects.
The main findings are as follows. The hazard of disappearance via acquisition is inversely related to asset size and quality, profitability, managerial efficiency, and positively related to bank capitalisation and liquidity. Small banks, banks with a larger proportion of assets in lending activities, and banks with high credit risk, are more likely to fail. Poorly capitalized banks and banks with high liquidity are at a greater hazard of disappearance via failure. There is evidence of an inverse relationship between bank size and growth, and there is some evidence of persistence in the growth performance of smaller banks over consecutive years.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of relevant literature. In section 3 we present the data set to be used in the empirical analysis and provide a descriptive analysis of demographic changes in the US banking industry during our sample period. Section 4 provides an analysis of the determinants of exit through M&A and failure, and discusses the impact of this consolidation on industry structure. Section 5 investigates the relationship between bank size and growth using a framework which mitigates against any sample selection bias. Finally, Section 6 concludes. cross-section of industries" (Sutton, 2007 (Sutton, , p.1557 .
Literature
It is well known that empirical firm size distributions in many industries are approximated closely by certain skewed distributions, such as the lognormal. A stochastic model in which the logarithmic size of each firm is subjected to a sequence of purely random shocks over time tends to generate a skewed distribution of this type. The hypothesis that the growth of each firm in each period is random (in other words, independent of observable characteristics of the firm including size or past growth) was first developed by Gibrat (1931) . According to Gibrat's law, growth is unrelated to size, and all firms have identical probabilities of achieving any given rate of growth in any period. Over time, however, some firms are 'lucky' and tend to draw an above-average share of high growth, while others are 'unlucky' and tend to grow slowly or decline. If growth is in accordance with Gibrat's law, industry concentration tends to increase naturally over time, and the firm size distribution becomes increasingly skewed. Three testable propositions are derived from Gibrat's law: growth is independent of firm size; the growth of any individual firm is non-persistent from one period to the next; and the cross-sectional variance of growth is independent of size.
In the empirical banking literature, tests of Gibrat's law have a long tradition. Alhadeff and Alhadeff (1964) [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . Large banks grew more slowly than small banks on average, and there was no persistence of growth.
Much of the previous empirical literature reports a tendency for smaller banks grow faster than their larger counterparts; but it has been suggested that a negative size-growth relationship might, at least in part, be an artifact of the way in which the empirical tests are constructed. Survivorship bias might be responsible for a negative reported size-growth relationship in studies based on data for banks that survived over a given observation period. Several of the earliest US manufacturing studies acknowledged that the validity of Gibrat's law might be limited to firms operating above a certain size threshold, or minimum efficient scale (e.g. Simon and Bonini, 1958) . The survival of small banks may hinge on their ability to achieve at least the MES, so that they can realize the benefits of economies of scale: small banks that grow slowly and fail to achieve the MES are likely to exit. A sample of surviving banks might register relatively high average growth at the lower end of the size distribution, owing to the non-recording of slow-growth non-survivors.
Over time, a pattern of growth that is independent of firm size generates a positively skewed firm size distribution. If growth rates are normally distributed, a lognormal firm size distribution emerges over the long run. This tendency might be modified, however, by changes to the population of firms resulting from entry, or exit through merger and acquisition (M&A) or failure. The rest of this section reviews the previous banking industry literature on entry and exit.
Empirical evidence on the determinants of entry to the banking industry is limited. Hannan (1983) examines the relationship between market characteristics and entry using bank data for Pennsylvania for . Entry is explained by a vector of market structure variables, and in general is deterred in markets when incumbents charge low prices and invest in expanding branch networks. This suggests that limit pricing and increasing capacity are important entry-deterring strategies. Rhoades (1980) reports that net entry (entry minus exits) played a limited role in increasing rivalry in local US banking markets during the period . More recent research suggests that investment in branch networks, advertising, and consumer switching costs all constitute barriers to effective competition with established counterparts (Dick, 2007; DeYoung and Ors, 2004) . For newly chartered US banks during the period 1980-85, Berger and Dick (2007) examine 10,000 cases of entry into local banking markets over the period . Early entry often translated into a longstanding market share advantage over later entrants, through investment in branch networks. Jeon and Miller (2007) examine the evolution of the population of US banks over the period . Although many small banks entered, only a small minority survived.
States with a more permissive regulatory environment experienced higher rates of entry and M&A, but there was no relationship between the regulatory environment and the rate of failure.
Consolidation through M&A has contributed significantly to reductions in the number of banks in the US and elsewhere (Berger, Kashyap and Scalise, 1995; Berger, Demsetz and Strahan, 1999; Amel, Barnes, Panetta and Salleo, 2004) . Corporate finance theory identifies the synergy, hubris and agency motives for M&A. Much empirical evidence on the motives for bank merger highlights the importance of the synergy motive (Rhoades, 1998; Wilson, 2000, 2004; Focarelli, Panetta and Salleo, 2002) . Banks with low earnings, low capital-to-assets ratios, high local market share, or which operate in urban areas, are more likely to be acquired (Hannan and Rhoades, 1987; Amel and Rhoades, 1989; Hannan and Piloff, 2009; DeYoung, Evanoff and Molyneux, 2009; Adams, 2012) .
Bank-specific, regulatory and regional economic conditions are identified as determinants of bank failure Wilson, 1995, 2000; Kolari, Glennon, Shin and Caputo, 2002; King, Nuxoll and Yeager, 2005; Demyanyk and Hasan, 2010; Cole and White, 2012) . Some recent studies suggest that corporate governance and involvement in nontraditional lines of business are also important in explaining bank failure (Berger, Imbievowic and Rauch, 2012; DeYoung and Torna, 2013) .
Data and descriptive analysis

Data
We obtain fourth-quarter data from 1984 to 2012 on private and public commercial banks in the US from the Reports on Condition and Income ("Call Reports") submitted by insured banks to the Federal Reserve. In 1984 there was a major overhaul of the Call Report format, requiring banks to report more detailed balance sheet data. Pre-1984 The acquiring bank is identified for all banks that exited as a result of M&A. M&A accounts for 80.6% of all bank exits. Table 1 reports the total number of US commercial banks at the end of December for the period , and an analysis of the evolution of the distribution of the population by asset size. Following the FDIC classification, the population is subdivided into four asset size classes in each year, defined in real terms (2012 prices based on the US GDP deflator) as follows: Band 1, total assets below $100 million; Band 2, total assets between $100 million and $1 billion; Band 3, total assets between $1 billion and $10 billion; and Band 4, total assets above $10billion.
Demographic change in the US banking industry
The number of US commercial banks declined from 14,410 in 1984 to 6,082 in 2012.
There was a marked shift in the composition of the population by asset size, owing to a combination of consolidation through acquisition and failure, and differences between the average internally-generated growth rates of small and large commercial banks. In 1984, for example, banks with assets below $100 million accounted for 65.2% of the population, while banks with assets between $100 million and $1 billion accounted for 31.6%. Table 2 reports a further analysis of the dynamics of change in the asset size distribution, in the form of a set of empirical yearly rates of transition between each size band and adjacent bands, and the exit rate from each size band. There is a high degree of stability in the asset size distribution from year to year. The propensity to remain within the same size band is relatively stable across the bands: on average, around 90% of the banks in each band remain in the same band the following year.
We also distinguish between exit by M&A and by failure. The rate of exit through M&A is significantly higher than the rate of exit through failure for all size bands. The rate of M&A was particularly high during the period from 1995-2000, owing 
Empirical analysis of exit through M&A or failure
This section reports an investigation of the determinants of US commercial bank disappearance through M&A or failure during the period 1984 . Following Wheelock and Wilson (2000 , we use a competing-risks model to consider explicitly the joint determination of the probability of being acquired and of failing. We use a Cox (1972) proportional-hazard models with time-varying covariates to examine the exit of banks. We estimate separate independent hazards for failure and acquisition. In the failure hazard estimation, the data for acquired banks are treated as right-censored; similarly, in the acquisition hazard estimation, the data for banks that failed are treated as right-censored.
Observations on banks that exited for reasons other than acquisition or failure are treated as right-censored in both estimations.
The hazard function expressing the probability that bank i disappears through event k between time t and time t+1, conditional on a vector of covariates specific to bank at time t that influence the probability of event k, denoted x i,k (t), is modelled as follows:
denotes the baseline hazard, and k is a vector of coefficients to be estimated. The time-index t is measured in calendar time elapsed since the first observation, for December 1984. The estimation uses data only for those banks that were in existence in December 1984; the data for post-1984 entrants is not considered. Accordingly, calendar time and duration until disappearance are equivalent for all observations used in the estimation. We let R t denote the set of banks that are in existence at time t and at risk of disappearance between t and t+1, and we let D k,t denote the set of d k,t banks that disappear through event k between time t and time t+1. The contribution to the partial likelihood function of bank i, which disappears through event k between t and t+1, is:
drops out when the partial likelihood function is formed. Therefore ) (t k  is not parameterized explicitly, and the proportional hazards model is described as semiparametric. The log-partial likelihood function is:
The hazard function covariates are: Log total assets (t-1); Growth rate (t-1); Equity/assets (t-1); Liquid assets/assets (t-1); Diversification (t-1); Loans/assets (t-1); Nonperforming loans/assets (t-1); ROA (t-1); and Noninterest expense/assets (t-1). Table 4 reports summary statistics for the variables used in the hazard function estimations. All variables, except size and age, are winsorized at 1% level to remove the influence of outliers. The average equity-to-assets ratio has increased steadily, from 8.88%
in 1984 to 11.09% in 2012. By contrast, the average liquid assets-to-total assets ratio shows no consistent trend, and has fluctuated around an average value of just over 15%. The average proportion of non-interest income to total operating income has increased steadily, 
Hazard of disappearance via M&A
Within each asset size band, larger banks are less likely to be acquired than their smaller counterparts. This finding is consistent with the received wisdom that smaller banks are more suitable takeover targets because they are more easily integrated into an acquirer's operations. Furthermore, small bank acquisitions are less likely to attract the attention of the anti-trust authorities.
The impact of recent growth on the hazard of acquisition varies across the size bands. For banks in Band 1, rapid recent growth reduces the likelihood of being acquired;
while for banks in Band 3, rapid recent growth increases the likelihood of being acquired.
The results suggest that the criteria for the selection of targets may vary with the size of the acquisition. If the target is a small bank slow growth may be attractive, if the acquirer is able to envisage opportunities for increasing the target's growth by absorbing the target into its own corporate identity and organizational culture (Moore, 1996; Pasiouras, Tanna, Gaganis, 2007) . By contrast, if the target is relatively large and the acquirer plans for the target to retain its own corporate identity and organizational culture, a past record of rapid growth may be an attractive criterion for selection, since the acquirer may prefer a target that can demonstrate an independent capability for sustaining growth (Hannan and Rhoades ,1987) .
We find that age is associated negatively with the likelihood of being acquired for banks in Band 1 and Band 2. However, age is associated positively with the hazard of acquisition for banks in Band 3.
Highly capitalized banks are less likely to be acquired. This result is consistent with Hannan and Piloff (2009) who contend that high capitalization indicates limited scope for post-merger efficiency gains. Wheelock and Wilson (2000) suggest that skilful managers might be able to operate banks safely with little capital, and such banks might be highly profitable or desirable takeover candidates.
Diversified banks are less attractive acquisition targets than their more focused counterparts. Small banks with low loans-to-assets ratios are more likely to be acquired, perhaps because acquirers envisage that there is potential to improve returns by increasing the proportion of loans within a larger and therefore more highly diversified merged assets portfolio. Banks with a higher non-performing loans ratio are more likely to be acquired in all asset size bands except Band 4. These results are consistent with previous evidence suggesting that a high-risk assets portfolio increases the probability of a bank being acquired (Wheelock and Wilson, 2000) .
Profitability (ROA) is associated positively with the hazard of acquisition for banks in Bands 1 and 2, but not for banks in the larger size bands. This result is inconsistent with previous studies (Wheelock and Wilson, 2000; Hannan and Piloff, 2009 ) that suggest a negative relationship between profitability and the likelihood of acquisition, usually justified by the hypothesis that poorly managed banks are likely targets for acquirers who believe they can increase the efficiency of the target, and consequently profit and shareholder value. However, if profitability primarily reflects local market trading conditions, rather than managerial performance, then acquirers may be more likely to seek targets in markets with profitable trading opportunities (Hannan and Rhoades, 1987; Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2005) .
The ratio of non-interest expenses to total assets, interpreted as a managerial inefficiency measure, is positively and significantly associated with the hazard of acquisition for all four asset size bands, suggesting that inefficiently managed banks are more vulnerable to acquisition. This finding is consistent with results reported by Hannan and Pilloff (2009) , but contrary to those of Wheelock and Wilson (2000) . There is an inverse relationship between liquidity and the hazard of acquisition for the smallest banks (Band 1); but the direction of association is reversed for larger banks (Bands 2 to 4). GDP growth and inflation are positively and significantly associated with the hazard of acquisition for banks in all size bands, reflecting a tendency for the rate of M&A to increase when economic conditions are buoyant.
Overall, the results indicate that smaller banks, poorly capitalized banks, highly specialized banks, and banks with higher credit risk, are more likely to be acquired. Several other factors impact on the hazard of acquisition in a manner that varies with bank size.
Hazard of Disappearance via Failure
The banks are found to be more likely to fail, consistent with previous research (Berger, Herring and Szego, 1995; Kim and Kross, 1998, Beltratti and Stulz, 2012) .
The extent of diversification is positively and significantly associated with the likelihood of failure for the smallest banks (Band 1), but not for banks in the other size bands. This suggests that for the smallest banks the safest strategy is to focus on traditional intermediation (deposit-taking and lending) business, rather than diversify into non-interest income lines of business.
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With the exception of banks in the largest size band, banks with larger loans-to-asset ratios are more likely to fail. This finding is consistent with previous research reporting that a higher concentration of bank assets in loans implies a higher likelihood of failure (Wheelock and Wilson, 2000) . A high non-performing loans ratio is positively and significantly associated with the hazard of failure for all but the largest banks in Band 4.
Unsurprisingly, the hazard of failure is negatively related to ROA for banks in all size bands.
There is no association between the ratio of non-interest expenses to assets, again interpreted as a measure of managerial inefficiency, and the hazard of failure. Banks in Bands 2 and 3 with a higher proportion of liquid assets face a higher hazard of failure hazard, but the same does not apply to banks in Bands 1 and 4. Although a bank with a high proportion of liquid assets may be better able to survive a liquidity shock, maintaining excessive liquidity could indicate mismanagement of the assets portfolio and a failure to pursue profitable investment opportunities.
Overall, the results indicate that poorly capitalized banks, banks with high loans-toasset ratios, banks with high credit risk, and banks with low profitability, are more likely to fail. The impact of the other factors on the hazard of failure varies across the assets size bands.
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Heckman sample selection modified test of Gibrat's law
In this section, we report tests for the validity of Gibrat's law, based on crosssectional regressions using the following general model specification:
In Equation (3), logarithmic growth over a one-year period is the dependent variable, where is the logarithm of total assets of bank i at time t, and log size at the start of the period and growth over previous one-year period are the explanatory variables. Following Goddard, McKillop and Wilson (2014) we assume that the coefficients are the same for all bank i but variable over time, so that = for all i. A series of cross-sectional regressions (for each t=1,….T) is defined as follows:
Each regression in Equation (4) has i = 1,…..N t observations (where N t is the number of banks live in year t). The focus is on the cross-sectional size-growth relationship, which might be either positive ( > 0), neutral ( = 0), or negative ( < 0). The case = 0 represents Gibrat's law.
The cross-sectional size-growth regressions are modified using the Heckman (1979) sample-selection correction, to mitigate possible survivorship bias. As argued above, an inverse empirical size-growth relationship may be a manifestation of survivorship bias. Small banks are less likely to survive than large banks, but fast-growing small banks are likelier to survive than slow-growing ones. As a consequence, estimations based on data on banks that survived over a given period are subject to a form of survivorship bias, because banks that failed to achieve rapid growth and exited were not recorded. The sample-selection model comprises Equation (4) and the following survivorship regression observed for all banks live at t-1:
We let the binary variable z i,t =1 denote survival between t-1 and t, and z i,t =0 denote nonsurvival. Then if ; and if , where is a vector of coefficients and x i,t-1 is a vector of covariates defined as follows: Log total assets; Growth rate; Equity/assets; Liquid assets/assets; Diversification; Loans/assets; Nonperforming loans/assets; ROA; and Noninterest expense/assets. Equation (4) is observed only for which in Equation (5). The disturbances in Equation (4) and in Equation (5) 
Final Thoughts
An understanding of the mechanisms that determine the structure of the banking industry is of crucial importance for small firm financing and investment, anti-trust policy, financial regulation and supervision, and financial stability. This paper attempts to shed light on these issues, by means of an exploration of the entry, exit and growth of commercial banks in the United States during the period .
The number of commercial banks has fallen steadily throughout this period, and there has been a marked shift in the composition of the population of banks by asset size, brought about by a combination of consolidation via acquisition and failure, and differences between the average internally-generated growth of small and large banks. Merger and acquisition accounts for most of the increase in industry concentration since 1984, as measured by the HHI.
Bank exit via acquisition is inversely related to asset size and quality, profitability, efficiency, capitalization and liquidity. Small banks with a higher proportion of assets committed to lending, and small banks with high credit risk, are more likely to fail. Poorly capitalized and highly liquid banks are at a greater hazard of disappearance via failure. We report evidence of an inverse relationship between bank size and growth, and persistence in growth performance from one year to the next among smaller banks.
The evolution of industry structure for commercial banking in the United States is undoubtedly a complex phenomenon. Forces that are currently generating further change in industry structure include technological progress, and re-regulation following the financial crisis. Further research aimed at examining the effects of such forces on the firm-size distribution will provide useful insights into the future evolution of industry structure. Berger, A.N. and Dick, A.A. (2007) . Entry into Banking Markets and the Early-Mover
Advantage, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 35, 775-807. Berger, A., Demsetz, R. and Strahan, P. (1999) . Notes: Asset size bands s are defined in real terms, measured in 2012 prices, as follows: Band 1, assets below $100 million; Band 2, assets between $100m and $1bn; Band 3, assets between $1bn and $10bn; and Band 4, assets above $10bn. All price conversions are based on the US GDP deflator. (-19 .333) (-4 .351) (-2.137 ) (-3.234 ) (-9 .701) (3.836) (-0.473 ) (-0 Table 6 Gibrat's law coefficients by year, 1986-2012 C5, C10 and C20 represent the 5-, 10-, and 20-bank concentration ratios, respectively.
HHI represents the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.
For the purposes of calculating the counterfactual HHI, each acquired bank is assumed to have continued to operate as a separate entity to the end of 2012. A proportion of the combined assets of the acquirer at each data-point after the merger took place are reallocated to the (counterfactually surviving) acquired bank. This proportion is based on the relative asset sizes of the acquirer and the acquired bank at the data point immediately preceding the merger (the final data point at which separate assets data are available for both banks).
